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I. INTRODUCTION
The State of Florida has long been known for its hard-line judicial
stance on labor and employment issues. Currently, challenges to Flor-
ida's traditional at-will doctrine focus on the concept of whistleblowing'
and the recent amendment of Florida's Public Sector Whistle-Blower's
Act ("Public Sector Act") to include private sector employees.2 Inter-
pretation of the Private Sector Whistle-Blower's Act ("Private Sector
Act") has just begun. Indeed, Florida courts are currently delving into
the many questions that the Private Sector Act presents. Lower state
courts interpreting the Private Sector Act view employment jurispru-
dence on many different, and often contradictory, levels. Few cases
have passed the pre-trial motion stage.
Today's legal landscape can offer litigants a unique opportunity to
take advantage of the statute's newness: decisions interpreting Florida's
1. Whistleblowing is "the act of a man or woman who, believing that the public interest
overrides the interest of the organization he serves, publicly 'blows the whistle' if the organization
is involved in corrupt, illegal, fraudulent, or harmful activity... " WHISTLE BLOWING: THE
REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY vii (Ralph Nader et al. eds.,
1972).
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 448.101-.105 (1997).
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Public Sector Act3 may allow more protection for the "good-faith" pri-
vate whistleblower. Such an interpretation may have important implica-
tions for private sector employees in Florida.
This Comment will examine the decisions of Florida courts and
their interpretations of both the Public Sector and Private Sector Acts in
Florida. Additionally, it will analyze these decisions in light of the
available interpretive options, adopted in other jurisdictions, which serve
generally to define the scope of whistleblower protection. Finally, this
comment will discuss obstacles to suits brought under the Private Sector
Act and possible strategies that practitioners may invoke in order to
achieve just results for plaintiffs seeking its protection.
II. FLORIDA'S EMPLOYMENT LANDSCAPE
A. Background
At-will employment, a product of the Industrial Revolution, is
based on the ideas of freedom of contract and mutual consideration.
According to at-will philosophy, employees may expect job security
only to the extent negotiated. Absent a written contract for employment
specifically outlining an employer's rights and duties in relation to and
in mutual consideration for the rights and duties of the employee, an
employer can terminate the employee for "any reason or even for no
reason at all."4 Modern commentators from the Law and Economics
School of Legal Philosophy support the at-will relationship and argue
that the doctrine offers industry advantages not otherwise available.5
For example, Professor Richard Epstein argues that the simplicity of the
at-will relationship reduces litigation costs and binds the employer and
employee together in the self-interested goal of avoiding the costs of
hiring and firing.6
Critics often counter that, in a modem economy, the Law and Eco-
nomics argument neglects to address the practical assumptions upon
which it rests. First, the argument assumes that the market for an
employee's labor is viable, thus positioning the employee in a fair nego-
tiating position with her employer. Moreover, the argument also
assumes that the average American employee is in a realistic position to
"take back her labor" when the employment situation calls for such
3. Id. § 112.3187.
4. WHISTLE BLOWING! LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 5 (Alan F. Westin ed.,
1981) [hereinafter LOYALTY & DISSENT].
5. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995). The
author argues that the simplicity of the at-will relationship is one of the doctrine's major
advantages. See id. at 159.
6. See id. at 158-59.
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power-based action. Finally, as discussed later in this Comment, expan-
sive protection for whistleblowers may actually save litigation costs and
promote the efficient use of resources, by publicly exposing the
improper activities of private businesses that drain individual, commu-
nity, local, state, and federal resources.
Since the mid-1900's, many social, political, and economic devel-
opments have sparked a new way of thinking about employment rela-
tions in the United States. Aside from the labor union movement of the
1930's, private workers remained largely unprotected in the workplace.
"Standards of personal morality, life-style, dress and grooming, associa-
tional activities, and political ideology could be (and were) set by com-
panies as conditions for hiring and advancement."7 In the 1960's, the
expansion of protection for unionized workers, the strength of the Civil
Rights movement, and the birth of consumer advocacy provided the con-
text in which Americans began to question the power of private industry
and the impact of that power on their lives.8 Furthermore, advancements
in professional codes of ethics and the proliferation of model rules and
codes have contributed to a new way of looking at the role of employees
in the workplace today.9
The enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196410 forged
an exception to the traditional American principle by prohibiting dis-
criminatory employment practices which, despite the at-will relation-
ship, an employer just could not engage in." Thereafter, Congress
expanded this concept by providing specific protections against such
unfair employment practices.' 2 The modem debate over whistleblow-
7. LOYALTY AND DISSENT, supra note 4, at 4.
8. See id. at 5-7.
9. See, e.g., Weider v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628 (N.Y. App. 1992) (attorney stated breach of
contract claim for wrongful discharge when terminated for reporting unethical conduct in his law
firm).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). Title VII provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or
joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or
retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any
individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or
applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this sub chapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this sub chapter.
Id. at § 2000e-3(a).
11. See id. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on "race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.").
12. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 215 (1994) (prohibiting discharge for exercising rights under
minimum wage and hour laws); id. § 623 (prohibiting discharge or refusal to hire based on age);
id. § 793 (prohibiting public employers or their agents from discriminating on the basis of a
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ing, however, does not focus on anti-discrimination measures enacted by
state and federal legislatures. Instead, whistleblower statutes generally
seek to expand the breadth and extent of the protection for the employee
in the workplace beyond the strictures of the at-will doctrine.
By its very nature, whistleblowing touches the nerve center of com-
peting tensions in American employment history. On one hand, loyalty
in one's microcosmic place of employment, and to one's employer, is a
fundamental concept. Indeed, a basic tenet of the law of agency requires
an agent "to act solely for the benefit of the principal."' 3 Employees
generally are expected to act in accordance with their employer's inter-
ests, as evidenced by the inclusion of traditional non-competition clauses
and confidentiality agreements in employment contracts.14
On the other hand, the worker-citizen, as a member of society at
large, has duties imposed upon her from sources such as the state (in the
form of laws, ordinances, and rules), her religion, her profession, her
community, and her family. This legal/ethical tension places the
worker-citizen in a precarious position once she, in good-faith, suspects
that her employer is engaging in some form of wrongdoing. 15 As a soci-
ety, we value both unrestrained individual freedom in a capital market as
well as the ability to nobly protest when our collective sense of morality
is offended. For the potential whistleblower, therein lies the conflict. If
she "blows the whistle," retaliation may ensue-she may be fired, trans-
ferred, demoted, "pushed-out," or simply shunned and labeled a traitor.
If she fails to act, some form of harm may result, ranging from the injus-
tice of the employer getting away with illegal or unethical conduct to
large-scale disaster, affecting many outside of the microcosm of
employment. 16
Several recent examples serve as a reminder that the issue of
whistleblowing is not as theoretical as the debate may suggest; in fact,
the situations in which whistleblowing arises have far-reaching practical
implications for the lives of many Floridians.
In 1996, an employee working at the Pinellas County Health
disability); 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994) (prohibiting private sector employers from discriminating
on the basis of a disability).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958).
14. See DANIEL P. WESTMAN, WHISTLEBLOWNG: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 23-
24 (1991); Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty and
Obedience: A Preliminary Inquiry, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 279 (1971).
15. See Nicholas M. Rongine, Toward a Coherent Legal Response to the Public Policy
Dilemma Posed by Whistleblowing, 23 AM. Bus. L.J. 284-87 (1985).
16. See generally LOYALTY AND DISSENT, supra note 4. This book discusses situations where
the whistle was not blown in time enough to save lives and prevent property destruction.
Examples include defective Firestone tires, the harmful effects of asbestos exposure, the Love
Canal disaster, the Ford Pinto, and Watergate. See id.
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Department publicly released a list of more than 4,000 people infected
with AIDS and the HIV virus, a leak called "the worst breach of AIDS
confidentiality in the nation."' 7 Four years earlier, however, Dade
County Public Records Supervisors were warned by Records Investiga-
tor Rhonda Cooley about potential security breaches and problems in
records security policies. Cooley alleges that a supervisor told her to
destroy these findings. 8
In the private sector, a whistleblower alleged that bent aircraft parts
were straightened rather than replaced, as required by the parts manufac-
turer, at a SaberTech facility.' 9 This most recent allegation may eventu-
ally effect a reopening of the hearings instigated by the fatal Everglades
crash that took the lives of 110 people in May of 1996.20
Finally, an attorney working for Prudential Insurance Company in
Jacksonville reported to state regulators that he witnessed another law-
yer shredding documents in connection with allegations of "churning"'"
by the insurance company. He blew the whistle after telling senior Pru-
dential officials that he believed that "the failure to expose the episode
amounted to 'obstruction of justice."' 22
These examples, spanning only three months in Florida, suggest
that whistleblowing plays an important role in regulating otherwise
unseen unlawful business conduct in the state.
B. Florida's At-Will Jurisprudence
Florida employment jurisprudence reflects the traditional doctrine
regarding the legal position of the American worker: an employee is
terminable "at will."
[I]f the period of employment is indefinite, either party may termi-
nate it at any time; that is, unless the employment contract specifi-
cally obligates both the employer and the employee for a definite
term of employment, the employment is considered to be indefinite
and terminable at the will of either party.23
17. Sally Kestin, Workers Say they Were Told to Destroy Report on AIDS Records, TAMPA
TRIBUNE, Nov. 7, 1996, at 1.
18. See id.
19. See Avoid Flying No-Frills on the Valujet Probe, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 7, 1997, at
A14.
20. See id.
21. Bruce Bryant-Friedland, More Prudential Shredding Reported, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION,
Dec. 28, 1996, at B4. "Churning" is "the deceptive sale of a new life insurance policy financed by
the cash value of an older policy." Id.
22. Id.
23. Catania v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265, 266 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (citations
omitted). See also DeMarco v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla. 3d DCA
1978) ("The established law is that where the term of employment is discretionary with either
party or indefinite, then either party for any reason may terminate it at any time and no action may
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Describing Florida employment law, a federal judge commented that
"Florida's at-will employment doctrine may be 'cold-hearted, draconian
and out-dated,' but it is the law of Florida.
24
Supporters of this doctrine argue that Florida's at-will environment
provides fertile soil for the growth of new business because a pro-busi-
ness community allows for industry stability by making loss allocation
more certain. Indeed, the Florida Legislature is currently seeking to
reform the tort system in an effort to stave off what is perceived to be a
coup d'6tat for the state of Louisiana, who recently advertised its pro-
business stance toward tort legislation in local newspapers. In fact,
Florida's thirty-seven-member Constitutional Revision Commission is
currently holding hearings on whether to include a tort reform initiative
on the November 1998 ballot.26
Although both the Florida legislature and the Florida courts have
strongly adhered to the employment at-will doctrine, exceptions have
been carved out. These exceptions include protections against wrongful
discharge where an employment contract specifies a definite term of
employment,27 where an employer's personnel policies providing for
"cause only" termination give rise to an enforceable employment con-
tract, 28 for filing a worker's compensation claim,29 and for when an
employee offers additional consideration for which she can expect to be
terminated for cause only. 30 The most recent inroad into the at-will doc-
trine came in 1991 when the Florida legislature amended its Public Sec-
tor Act, first passed in 1986, to include protection for private sector
employees." While the motivation behind this exception is clear, both
the Florida legislature and judiciary have encountered considerable diffi-
culty in defining a coherent and defensible network of protections for
the whistleblower in the workplace.
be maintained for breach of the employment contract.") (citations omitted), affd per curiam, 384
So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980); Hope v. National Airlines, Inc., 99 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957).
24. Zombori v. Digital Equipment Corp., 878 F. Supp. 207, 209 (N.D. Fla. 1995). See also
id. at 208 ("Florida law stands squarely against recognizing a common law prima facie tort claim
based on retaliatory discharge.").
25. See Nancy Cook Lauder, Hopes Raised for Tort Reform, JACKSONVILLE Bus. J., Mar. 7,
1997; John D. McKinnon, Looking Glass Law: Reflections on Florida's Tort Law, FLORIDA
TREND, July 1, 1996, at 40; Capital Report (Florida Public Radio Broadcast, Feb. 13, 1997)
(reporting that the Florida Legislature's resurrection of tort reform movement is an effort to
compete with pro-business states like Louisiana).
26. See David. R. Williams, Time for Fiscal Reform (Florida Constitution Reviewed),
FLORIDA TREND, Aug. 1, 1997, at 91.
27. See Catania, 381 So. 2d at 266; DeMarco, 360 So. 2d at 136; Hope, 99 So. 2d at 246.
28. See Falls v. Lawnwood Medical Center, 427 So. 2d 361, 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
29. See Smith v. Piezo Tech. and Prof'l Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1983).
30. See Chatelier v. Robertson, 118 So. 2d 241, 244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960).
31. See FLA. STAT. §§ 448.101-105 (1997).
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III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE
A. Contract and Tort Theories
Many states have created exceptions to the at-will doctrine in order
to provide a cause of action for wrongful or retaliatory discharge in the
absence of a specific legislative pronouncement. Most of these states
have grappled with the idea of whether to characterize a right of action
for wrongful discharge as falling under contract or tort principles.
In the 1980's, Florida courts consistently rejected the adoption of
either a tort or a contract action for wrongful or retaliatory discharge.
Recent cases, however, suggest the existence of an exception where state
or federal law states a clear and important public policy.33
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed its acceptance of employment
at-will in DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc.34 when it denied a
cause of action to a supermarket employee discharged allegedly as a
result of his filing a personal injury suit on behalf of his daughter who
was injured when a bottle exploded. The court also rejected the argu-
ment that the "access to courts provision" found in Article I, Section 21
of the Florida Constitution created a private right of action for retaliatory
discharge. In the same year, the Third District Court of Appeal relied
on DeMarco in Catania v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.36
In Catania, the plaintiffs brought suit asserting both tort and con-
tract theories. Plaintiffs first argued that public policy required recogni-
tion of a wrongful discharge cause of action. The court noted:
[M]any courts have found a breach of contract action for wrongful
32. For wrongful discharge characterized as a tort action, see McNulty v. Borden, Inc. 474 F.
Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1334-35 (Cal.
1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 427 A.2d 385, 387-89 (Conn. 1980); Palmateer v. Int'l
Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co.,
265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151 (Mich. 1976);
Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 390 A.2d
149, 150 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978); Chin v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 410 N.Y.S.2d 737, 770
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. Standard Pump - Aldrich Div., 422 A.2d 611,
616-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119, 120 (Pa. 1978);
Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 177 (Pa. 1974); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 568 P.2d 764, 770 (Wash. 1977). For wrongful discharge characterized as a contract action,
see M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Ark. 1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register
Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-56 (Mass. 1977); Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273, 1274
(N.H. 1980); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974).
33. See Smith, 427 So. 2d at 184; Baiton v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 661 So. 2d 313, 314-
15 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Hutchison v. Prudential Ins. of Am., 645 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA
1994). But see Zombori v. Digital Equip. Corp., 878 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Fla. 1995); Hartley v.
Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327, 1328-30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Catania v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
34. 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980).
35. See id. at 1254.
36. 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
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discharge despite the old rule, doing so on public policy grounds.
They have implied a good faith element restriction on an employer's
absolute and unbridled right to discharge for any reason, no reason,
or a false reason, or they have found that in given instances the
grounds for the discharge contravened other strong public policies of
the state. We reject the plaintiffs invitation to be a "law giver" in
this case.37
The court reasoned that to extend such a cause of action would
require the courts to weigh the employer's motive for discharging the
employee in each case, which courts have found "difficult and
inappropriate.
38
As for a cause of action in tort, the Catania court stated that "[n]ot
every violation of public policy is a tort in the absence of an allegation
of acts constituting a breach of the plaintiffs legal rights and causing
injury to the plaintiffs' person, property or reputation."3 9 Despite the
legislative intent expressed in section 447.01 of the Florida Statutes to
protect the non-unionist, the unionist and the "right to work which is the
right to live," the court said that such a public policy was "too general to
permit legal analysis."4 ° In 1985, the Third District followed its Catania
analysis in Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc. 41 and explicitly stated that
Florida law does not recognize a cause of action for retaliatory discharge
based solely on a general notion of public policy.
In 1989, the Fifth District Court of Appeal summed up Florida law
relating to causes of action for retaliatory discharge in Kelly v. Gill:42
In the absence of a specific statute granting a property interest, a con-
tract of employment (implied or express) which is indefinite as to
term of employment is terminable at the will of either party without
cause and an action for wrongful discharge will not lie .... There is
also no cause of action based in common law tort for wrongful dis-
missal such as negligence, malice, or retaliation. It is also clear that
breach of an obligation of good faith and fair dealing has not been
recognized in Florida as a viable cause of action, at least where a
wrongful dismissal is claimed.43
This case was recently revisited by the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida in Zombori v. Digital Equipment
37. Id. at 267.
38. Id.
39. Id. (citations omitted).
40. Id.
41. 476 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
42. 544 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), rev. denied, 553 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 1989). Accord
Hartley, 476 So. 2d at 1330; Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 269 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1983).
43. Kelly, 544 So. 2d at 1164 (citations omitted).
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Corp.4 In this case, the plaintiff alleged that she was fired because she
aided her husband's testimony in a suit against their employer by giving
her husband's lawyer a report compiled from the employer's databases.
Although Zombori brought suit under the Private Sector Act in Count I
of her complaint, the employer sought only to dismiss Zombori's prima
facie tort claim.45 The federal court, sitting in diversity, recognized that
"Florida law stands squarely against recognizing a common law prima
facie tort claim based on retaliatory discharge. 46 Despite Zombori's
arguments that Florida law changed since Kelly, the court stated:
Notably, Florida's legislature and courts have created exceptions to
the at-will doctrine allowing employees to assert wrongful discharge
claims in certain circumstances. By doing so, Florida's legislators
and judges have attempted to conform the doctrine to current public
policy. Given these officials are elected and appointed by the people
of Florida, it is their duty to define Florida law on this and other
subjects ... [Zombori's] arguments are best addressed to the courts
and legislature of Florida.47
This deference to the legislature, while generally shared by Florida
courts, becomes particularly significant when one focuses on the plight
of the whistleblower. There are many important reasons, despite the at-
will employment relationship, why courts should allow such causes of
action in the case of whistleblowing, that would not necessarily apply to
cases of employment dismissal in general.
It is well-settled that courts are hesitant to adopt general notions of
public policy as a basis for employment decisions.48 "Public policy, like
society, is continually evolving and those entrusted with its implementa-
tion must respond to its everchanging demands."49 Thus, definitive
statements of public policy come from the legislature. It is impossible,
however, for lawmakers to address prospectively through general legis-
lation the myriad of specific situations which arise. This is the court's
duty.
Thus, courts must recognize that, while deference to the legislature
is desirable, the judiciary plays a role in the evolution of society and the
public policy which it espouses. It is in this respect that public policy
becomes a compelling argument for the whistleblower. The nexus of the
at-will doctrine and public policy provides the opportunity for courts to
pronounce the legislative intent of the state. For example, where the
44. Zombori v. Digital Equipment Corp., 878 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Fla. 1995).
45. See id. at 208.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 209-10.
48. See supra notes and accompanying text Part 1II.B.
49. Sprinzen v. Nomberg, 389 N.E.2d 456, 458 (N.Y. 1979).
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legislature has passed a law prohibiting some form of business practice,
and a whistleblower is discharged from employment because she has
disclosed such a violation, more than equity requires that the
whistleblower be protected from such injustice. Particularly where the
whistleblower is faced with criminal sanctions or is otherwise under a
duty to report improper conduct, the at-will doctrine can no longer oper-
ate as bar to justice.
51
The State of California has recognized such a distinction. In
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,5' the plaintiff
was fired for refusing to lie under oath at the behest of his employer.
The court held that the public policy of the state included the encourage-
ment of truthful testimony in court.52 Similarly, in Baiton v. Carnival
Cruise Lines,53 Florida's Third District Court of Appeal found it signifi-
cant that the plaintiff's alleged discharge was based on his agreement to
give testimony under oath, thus subjecting him to charges of perjury
with attendant criminal sanctions, if he had testified untruthfully in order
to save his job. In effect, the court held that a whistleblower can invoke
the protection of the Private Sector Act when to comply with an
employer's request would be a crime.
With respect to actions based in contract, in Falls v. Lawnwood
Medical Center5 4 the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a grant of
summary judgment in favor of the employer, where a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether the employer's personnel policies
were part of the employee's employment contract. This exception is
grounded in the idea that where the employee is hired with the express
understanding that the policies and procedures governing termination are
those expressed by the employer in employee handbooks, personnel
manuals, or other written or oral manifestations of policy, they are
deemed to be the employee's contract of employment. This decision
has, however, been severely limited in subsequent applications.
For example, just two years after Lawnwood was decided, the First
District Court of Appeal affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor
of the employer where the plaintiffs claimed that, since their employer
was converted from a public to a private corporation, the policies in
50. But see DeMarco v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980). In addition
to the court's reaffirmance of the at-will doctrine in this case, the decision demonstrates a choice
on the part of the legislature and the courts between the plaintiffs job and his daughter's insurance
issues, placing the burden directly on the employee. Such an interpretation would be unfortunate
in the whistleblower context.
51. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
52. See id. at 27.
53. 661 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
54. 427 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
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effect before the transition withstood the transfer. 5' The court held that
the plaintiff s "assertions that the alleged personnel policies were part of
their contract of employment with the new [corporation] were mere uni-
lateral expectations, rather than mutual promises necessary to create a
binding contractual term."'56 The court distinguished Lawnwood by stat-
ing that, in that case, a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning
the existence of a provision of termination only for just cause.
57 Ulti-
mately, the court found that the employer had not explicitly made the
decision to provide for termination with cause, even though it expressly
adopted the predecessor corporation's policies and procedures which did
so provide. 8
Again, in the 1988 case of Lurton v. Muldon Motor Co.,59 the First
District Court of Appeal refused to find an employer's written policy
requiring termination for just cause binding on the employer for two
reasons. First, the policy was not in effect when the plaintiff was hired.
In fact, the plaintiff had actually written the policy for his employer dur-
ing his employment. Second, the court stated that because this case
reached the appellate court after a full-blown trial, it was distinguishable
from Lawnwood, which was an appeal from a grant of summary judg-
ment. This appears significant in light of the fact that the appellate court
acknowledged the trial court "made no explicit finding that the manuals
were not a term of the employment contract," and instead found such a
finding implicit in the lower court's decision.
60
Most recently, the First District summarized the law in Florida
regarding when an employer's written policies give rise to causes of
action for wrongful termination. In Linafelt v. Bev, Inc. Enterprises,6
the court stated that "[U]nilateral policy statements cannot, without
more, give rise to an enforceable contract. In Florida, policy statements
are not employment contracts unless there is an express reference in the
statement to a period of employment and the benefits to accrue
therefrom. 62
After Linafelt, it seems clear that Florida law has witnessed the
demise of the Lawnwood doctrine. The language of Linafelt limits the
55. See Bryant v. Shands Teaching Hospital and Clinics, Inc., 479 So. 2d 165, 168 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1985).
56. Id. at 168 (citations omitted).
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. 523 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
60. Id. at 709.
61. 662 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
62. Id. at 989 (citations omitted). Accord LaRocca v. Xerox Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1002, 1003
(S.D. Fla. 1984); Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 268-70 (Fla. 2d DCA
1983).
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use of an employer's policy statements to cases in which a contract
otherwise exists by requiring the presence of a definite term of dura-
tion-that which traditionally has drawn the line between employment
at-will and employment existing under an express contract. In contrast,
Lawnwood allowed the use of an employer's policy procedures to prove
the existence of an implied contract. In the end, this unfortunate line of
cases has effectively limited the Lawnwood case to its specific facts and
has made the possibility of successfully arguing the foregoing "policies
and procedures" cases extremely doubtful.
B. Legislative Proscription
Generally, states have created public policy protections for wrong-
ful discharge in two different ways. Some states view a cause of action
for wrongful discharge as an exception to the at-will doctrine.63 An
excellent expression of this point of view is found in the dissenting opin-
ion by Justice Clarence Brown in Phung v. Waste Management, Inc.64
Although the case held that public policy does not require that there be
an exception to the at-will doctrine when an employee is discharged for
reporting to his employer that it is conducting its business in violation of
the law, Judge Brown drew on the exceptions to the at-will doctrine
adopted by other states, and aptly summarized as follows:
[T]he doctrine of at-will employment developed in a laissez-faire cli-
mate that encouraged industrial growth and strongly approved an
employer's right to control his own business .... Although I am well
aware that today's climate demands continued industrial growth, in
my view, justice requires that an employee conduct business in a law-
ful manner .... [T]he state has a legitimate interest in knowing that
the regulations which protect Ohio's citizenry are complied with by
the persons being regulated.65
Under this view, an employer could not fire an at-will employee for
reasons that contravene general notions of public policy. Although Flor-
ida has expressly rejected this possibility in other contexts, 66 public pol-
icy is a thread running throughout cases interpreting both the Private and
63. For wrongful discharge characterized as an exception to the at-will doctrine based on
public policy, see Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 620 P.2d 699 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Jackson v.
Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 563 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977); Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, 270 N.W.2d
454 (Iowa 1978); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Mau v.
Omaha Nat'l Bank, 299 N.W.2d 147 (Neb. 1980).
64. 491 N.E.2d 1114 (Ohio 1986).
65. Id. at 1118.
66. See Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (rejecting the
notion that a cause of action for wrongful discharge exists based on general conceptions of public
policy).
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Public Whistle-Blower Acts. 67 These cases seem to indicate an extent to
which the court may accept public policy justifications for furthering the
protections of the private sector whistleblower, despite the lack of spe-
cific language in the statute. It seems that if the employer's violation is
serious enough, Florida courts may allow some leeway.
For example, in Forrester v. John H. Phipps, Inc.,68 Pamela For-
rester sued her employer, Channel Six, for suspending her several times
following her refusal to retract statements made to a local newspaper
regarding disciplinary actions previously taken against her. The trial
court dismissed her complaint with prejudice, agreeing with the
employer that the Private Sector Act covered only violations of law,
rules or regulations that pertained specifically to an employer's business.
The First District Court of Appeal rejected this view as too narrow an
interpretation of sections 448.101-.105. On the other hand, the court
also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the "law, rule or regulation"
language of scetion 448.101 was broad enough to encompass matters of
public policy. The court stated:
We are confident that the legislature did not intend to create a cause
of action for what essentially amounts to an internal and personal
dispute between appellant and her employer ... Justice Terrell once
observed "public policy was described as a very unruly horse, and,
when once you get astride it, you never know where it will carry
you."6 9
The court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint with prejudice
because it could not "agree that the 'public policy' issues such as those
complained of by the appellant fall within the ambit of section
448.101(4), ' '7° thus suggesting that agreement with false statements and
slander were not important enough public policy justifications to invoke
statutory protection under the Private Sector Act.
In Hutchison v. Prudential Insurance Co.," however, the Third
District Court of Appeal granted the plaintiff leave to amend his com-
plaint to include a claim under the Private Sector Act, in addition to his
Public Sector Act claim, suggesting that, in the opinion of the court, his
allegations of unfair trade practices in violation of section 626.9541 of
67. See, e.g., Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1994); Baiton v. Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc., 661 So. 2d 313, 316 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Kelder v. ACT Corp., 650 So. 2d
647, 649 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Forrester v. John H. Phipps, Inc., 643 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1994); Hutchison v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 645 So. 2d 1047, 1048 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
68. 643 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
69. Id. at 1111-12 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 1112.
71. Hutchinson, 645 So. 2d at 1048.
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the Florida Statutes, were of enough merit to justify an opportunity to
seek protection under both Acts.
Although public policy justifications for the recognition of excep-
tions to the at-will doctrine have rarely been accepted, Florida courts
have explicitly recognized an exception to the at-will doctrine where the
legislature has defined a clear public policy requiring it.72 This excep-
tion allows a cause of action for wrongful discharge where the discharge
violates a clear and obvious expression of legislative intent to prohibit
such dismissals in specific situations.73 This recognition of public pol-
icy, as opposed to contract or tort theories, directly relates to statutory
enforcement as a policy goal. As of 1998, however, this doctrine has
been applied in only two situations. In the workers compensation con-
text, section 440.205 of the Florida Statutes states: "Coercion of
employees. No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimi-
date, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim
for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers'
Compensation Law."74 The Florida Supreme Court announced this
exception in Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Administra-
tors.75 Relying on traditional rules of statutory construction, the court
stated:
Where a statute requires an act be done for the benefit of another or
forbids the doing of an act which may be to his injury, though no
action be given in express terms by the statute for the omission or
commission, the general rule of law is that the party injured should
have an action; for where a statute gives a right, there, although in
express terms it has not given a remedy, the remedy which by law is
properly applicable to that right follows as an incident.76
Further, the court explained its reason for adopting such an exception:
"Thus, because the legislature enacted a statute that clearly imposes a
duty and because the intent of the section is to preclude retaliatory dis-
charge, the statute confers by implication every particular power neces-
sary to insure the performance of that duty."77
72. See Smith v. Piezo Tech. and Prof l Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983).
73. See id. at 184 (stating that the law concerning the at-will doctrine is well entrenched in the
jurisprudence of this state and may not be modified on any basis but a clear statutory abrogation of
the rule); see also Bryant v. Shands Teaching Hosp. and Clinics, Inc., 479 So. 2d 165, 167 (Fla.
1st DCA 1985) ("While it is true that the legislature may carve out exceptions to the at-will
doctrine, . . . this court is not free to identify additional statutory modifications of the at-will
doctrine unless the legislature renders a clear statement of its intent to do so."); accord Maguire v.
American Family Life Assurance Co. of Columbus, 442 So. 2d 321, 323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
74. FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (1997).
75. 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983).
76. Id. at 184 (quoting Girard Trust Co. v. Tampashores Dev. Co., 117 So. 786, 788 (1928)).
77. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Maxwell, 2 Fla. 594 (1849)).
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Similarly, the Florida legislature passed The Whistle-Blower's Act
of 1986 to protect public employees from retaliation for exposing
improper employer conduct that threatens the "health, safety, or wel-
fare" of the citizens of Florida.78 Without leaving the courts to interpret
whether the statute provided a cause of action, the legislature provided
one, allowing for express remedies. 79 Furthermore, the Private Sector
Act arose from the 1991 amendment of the existing Whistle-Blower Act
(section 112.3187), by granting private sector employees comparable
and explicit whistleblowing protections. Section 448.101 et. seq., intro-
duced as Senate Bill 74 and later becoming Session Law 91-285,
extends the protection of section 112.3187 to private employees in firms
of ten or more employees.80 The bill was enacted into law during the
1991 legislative session.81 Sections four and five of the Bill were subse-
quently codified as the current Private Sector Act, sections 448.101
through 448.105. Because the Private Sector Act is merely the result of
an amendment to the Public Sector Act, it is reasonable to expect Florida
courts to interpret both acts in a very similar, if not identical, fashion.82
Unlike the worker's compensation statute, this amendment created
an express civil right of action for private employees who blow the
whistle and who are discharged in retaliation for doing so. 83 Section
448.103(2) lists the relief available to a whistleblower invoking the stat-
ute's protection: injunction, reinstatement of employment, benefits and
seniority, back pay, and any other compensatory damages allowable at
law.8 4 Section 448.104 allows the prevailing party to receive reasonable
attorney's fees, costs and expenses.85 Section 448.105 expressly pro-
vides that "[t]his act does not diminish the rights, privileges, or remedies
of an employee or employer under any other law or rule or under any
collective bargaining agreement or employment contract."86
Following the analysis in Smith and cases in which statutory inter-
pretation is required, in the whistleblowing context, the court's duty is
clear: Because "the statute confers . . . every particular power necessary
to insure the performance of that duty, 87 the court must grant access in
favor of the remedy.88 Generally, whistleblower laws are construed
78. FLA. STAT. § 112.3187(2) (1997).
79. Id. § 112.3187(9).
80. 1991 Fla. Laws ch. 91-285.
81. Id.
82. See Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1994).
83. FLA. STAT. § 448.103(1)(a) (1997).
84. Id. § 448.103(2).
85. Id. § 448.104.
86. Id. § 448.105.
87. Smith, 427 So. 2d at 184 (quoting Mitchell v. Maxwell, 2 Fla. 594 (1849).
88. See Arrow Air, 645 So. 2d at 424.
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broadly in light of their remedial purpose.8 9
At least one Florida decision thus far has construed the meaning of
"remedial" with respect to the Private Sector Act. In Arrow Air, Inc. v.
Walsh,9° Michael Walsh, a flight engineer, alleged he was fired for
delaying a scheduled flight for five hours until repairs could be made to
the plane's hydraulic system, and for reporting the safety violations in
connection with that flight. The Florida Supreme Court held that, while
a law with a remedial purpose is presumed to apply retroactively absent
specific statutory language to the contrary, the Private Sector Act should
not be so applied.9' The court, agreeing that a law creating new substan-
tive rights and liabilities creates a new presumption against retroactive
application, 9 was primarily concerned with employers being held liable
for retaliatory discharge without receiving actual or constructive notice
of their potential liability.93 This confirms the business certainty policy
of Florida's pro-employer at-will doctrine, suggesting that construction
of statutes affecting this policy will allow only narrowly drawn
exceptions.
To conclude that the Private Sector Act creates an exception to the
at-will doctrine in Florida does not require the creation of a cause of
action in either tort or contract for retaliatory discharge, nor does it
require the courts to create an exception to the judicially created at-will
doctrine in favor of public policy. Simply stated, the legislature has pro-
scribed termination of employment, in spite of the at-will doctrine,
where it is done in retaliation for whistleblowing. As a remedial act,
there is even more support for such a conclusion.
Florida courts have yet to explicitly recognize that either the Public
Act or the Private Sector Act are express legislative exceptions to the at-
89. See, e.g., Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. I11. 1993). Neal stated that:
Many courts have addressed issues under different federal whistleblower protection
statutes. Almost without exception, they have held that the coverage of the statute
at issue should be broadly construed so as to include internal, or 'intracorporate'
whistleblowing, even where the conduct involved did not come under the literal
terms of the statute.
Id. at 270; see also NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972) (National Labor Relations Act);
Jones v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 948 F.2d 258,264 (6th Cir. 1991) (Energy Reorganization Act);
Pogue v. United States Dep't of Labor, 940 F.2d 1287, 1989 (9th Cir. 1991) (Clean Water Act);
Rayner v. Smirl, 873 F.2d 60, 63 (4th Cir. 1989) (Federal Railroad Safety Act).
90. 645 So. 2d at 424 (Fla. 1994).
91. See id. at 425.
92. See Young v. Altenhaus, 472 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1985); Walker & LaBerge, Inc. v.
Halligan, 344 So. 2d 239, 241 (Fla. 1977); Dep't of Revenue v. Zuckerman-Vernon Corp., 354 So.
2d 353, 358 (Fla. 1977).
93. Arrow Air, 645 So. 2d at 424 (a presumption against retroactivity will generally coincide
with legislative and public expectations) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483
(1994)).
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will doctrine. As explored below, there are sound reasons for adopting
such a interpretation.
IV. FLORIDA'S PRIVATE SECTOR ACT
As previously noted, the Private Sector Act creates a substantive
right of action94 in a private employee who blows the whistle on
employer conduct that is in violation of a law, rule or regulation. Once
the Private Sector Act is invoked, however, ambiguities arise. Courts
have only recently begun to interpret the statutory language of the Pri-
vate Sector Act, thus creating considerable uncertainty for plaintiffs cur-
rently seeking its protection. Moreover, case law is sparse-both
procedurally and substantively. In fact, most of the reported cases end
in the pre-trial motion stage, and those that do shed light on the Private
Sector Act's substantive content are conflicting and confusing at best.
The Private Sector Act limits the definition of private sector
whistleblowing to three specific categories of action enumerated in sec-
tions 448.102(1), (2) and (3). The first, section 448.102(1), prohibits
retaliation against an employee who has "[d]isclosed, or threatened to
disclose, to any appropriate governmental agency, under oath, in writ-
ing, an activity, policy, or practice of the employer that is in violation of
a law, rule, or regulation."95 According to this subsection,96 an employee
must provide written notice to the supervisor or employer in advance of
any action in order to provide the employer an opportunity to remedy the
situation.97 The literal language of this subsection also suggests that
what the employee discloses must in fact be "in violation of a law, rule,
or regulation."98 As explored later, this would be an unfortunate
interpretation.
The second subsection, section 448.102(2), protects an employee
who "[p]rovided information to, or testified before, any appropriate gov-
ernmental agency, person, or entity conducting an investigation, hearing,
94. See id. "[T]he private sector Whistle-Blower's Act serves ... to protect private
employees who report or refuse to assist employers who violate laws enacted to protect the public.
However, the Act accomplishes this purpose by creating a new cause of action and thereby
directly affects substantive rights and liabilities." Id.
95. FLA. STAT. § 448.102(1) (1997).
96. The Florida Statutes are organized according to a statutory numbering system found in the
preface to each volume of the Florida Statutes: Chapter, subchapter, section, subsection,
paragraph, subparagraph. See Baiton v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 661 So. 2d 313, 316 n.5 (Fla.
3d DCA 1995); Daniel R. Levine, Baiton v. Carnival Cruise Lines: An Important Decision in the
Evolution of Florida's Whistle-Blower's Act, FLA. B.J., May 1996, at 59.
97. See FLA. STAT. § 448.102(1) (1997). "However, this subsection does not apply unless the
employee has, in writing, brought the activity, policy, or practice to the attention of a supervisor or
the employer and has afforded the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the activity,
policy, or practice." Id.
98. Id.
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or inquiry into an alleged violation of a law, rule, or regulation by the
employer."99 Finally, section 448.102(3) shields an employee who
"[o]bjected to, or refused to participate in, any activity, policy, or prac-
tice of the employer which is in violation of a law, rule, or regulation"
from retaliation.' 00
According to the Florida Supreme Court, the Private Sector Act is
remedial in nature and, as such, "should be liberally construed in favor
of granting access to the remedy."'' A comparative analysis of public
and private sector case law may shed light on what to expect in Florida
courts when litigating substantive Private Sector Act claims, particularly
where the issues present determinative outcomes for plaintiffs' lawyers
where either (1) the employee did not provide written notice to the
appropriate entity before blowing the whistle, (2) the employee relies on
authority other than a law, rule or regulation, or (3) the employee had a
good faith belief that the employer was engaging in prohibited activities.
A. The Written Notice Requirement
Recently, the Fifth District Court of Appeal interpreted the Public
Sector Act's requirement that employee complaints be issued in writ-
ing.'0 2 Patricia Kelder was a Social Rehabilitation Counselor at ACT,
an independent contractor receiving funds from HRS, and was responsi-
ble for providing mental health counseling services to patients for which
Medicaid would reimburse the independent contractor. Kelder brought
suit under the Public Sector Act alleging wrongful termination because
she repeatedly complained to her supervisors that she was required to
bill Medicaid patients for services and time that they were not receiving.
Kelder's complaint was dismissed because she complained internally,
but not to "any agency or federal government entity having the authority
to investigate, police, manage, or otherwise remedy the violation or act,"
as required by the Public Sector Act.'03
Two sections of the Public Sector Act were at issue in this case:
section 112.3187(6) and section 112.3187(7). The first, entitled "To
Whom Information is Disclosed," states that:
The information discussed under this section must be disclosed to any
agency or federal government entity having the authority to investi-
gate, police, manage, or otherwise remedy the violation or act,
99. Id. § 448.102(2).
100. Id. § 448.102(3).
101. Arrow Air, Inc. v. Walsh, 645 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1994) (quoting Martin County v.
Edenfield, 609 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. 1992), interpreting the private sector Whistle-Blower's Act in
light of its public counterpart).
102. See Kelder v. ACT Corp., 650 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
103. FLA. STAT. § 112.3187(6) (1997).
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including, but not limited to, the Office of the Chief Inspector Gen-
eral, an agency inspector general or the employee designated as
agency inspector general under s. 112.3189(1) or inspectors general
under s. 20.055, the Office of Public Counsel, and the whistle-
blower's hotline created under § 112.3189. However, for disclosures
concerning a local government entity, including any regional, county
or municipal entity, special district, community college district, or
school district or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, the
information must be disclosed to a chief executive officer as defined
in s. 447.203(5) or other appropriate official.'"
The second, entitled "Employees and Persons Protected," states:
"This section protects employees and persons who disclose information
on their own initiative in a written and signed complaint .... 5
The court rejected Kelder's argument that section 112.3187(7)
implies that if an employee complained to her supervisors in writing, she
does not have to disclose the information to an agency or federal govern-
ment entity. Indeed, Kelder argued that because her employers were
made aware of her complaint and could "remedy the violation," no fur-
ther complaints were necessary. The court, however, read subsections
(6) and (7) together, remarking that they were "no models of clarity."'
'1 6
The court stated:
Where construction is required, the court should seek to effectuate the
legislative intent. Thus, even if the two subsections create an ambigu-
ity when read together, the legislature's amendment of the word
"shall" to "must" evinces a legislative intent that, in order to obtain
relief under the statute, the employee must disclose the information to
an appropriate agency or federal government entity.
107
On the other hand, in Hutchison v. Prudential Life Insurance Com-
pany, °8 the Third District Court of Appeal held that where a Prudential
employee sent a letter to the Monroe County Sheriff's Department in an
effort to alert them to what he believed to be Prudential's misrepresenta-
tion of life insurance policies as retirement plans, the letter was suffi-
cient to fulfill the statutory requirement of "a written and signed
complaint" found in section 112.3187(7). Additionally, the court
rejected Prudential's argument that the plaintiff should have notified the
Florida Department of Insurance instead of the Sheriffs Department.
The court stated that "[w]hile the Sheriffs Department is not an insur-
ance regulatory agency, the Sheriff's Department clearly did have
104. Id. § 112.3187(6).
105. Id. § 112.3187(7).
106. Kelder, 650 So. 2d at 649.
107. Id.
108. Hutchison v. Prudential Ins. Co., 645 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
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authority to ... otherwise remedy the violation." ' 9 In the end, the court
not only reversed the dismissal of the complaint, but also granted Hutch-
ison leave to amend his complaint to plead an alternative claim under the
Private Sector Act.
The Third District interpreted the Private Sector Act writing
requirement in Baiton,I ° with results more in line with Hutchison, than
with the Kelder decision. Baiton, a seaman, alleged retaliatory dis-
charge resulting from his agreement to testify against Carnival Cruise
Lines in a suit brought under the Jones Act1 ' by a co-worker. The court
reversed the trial court's order dismissing with prejudice Baiton's sec-
ond amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action under the
Private Sector Act.' 
1 2
From the outset, the court characterized Baiton as "an at-will
employee of Carnival,"' 13 thus setting the stage for an opinion recogniz-
ing that the analysis to follow would implicate the at-will rule in Florida
in a new way. In holding that Baiton stated a cause of action, the court
construed the substantive pre-condition requirement of written notice to
the employer found in two separate sections of the Private Sector Act.
The first, section 448.102(1), qualifies the first category in which a
whistleblower is protected-that is, where the employee has
"[d]isclosed, or threatened to disclose" employer activity. This subsec-
tion explicitly states that it "does not apply unless the employee has, in
writing, brought the activity, policy, or practice to the attention of a
supervisor or the employer and has afforded the employer a reasonable
opportunity to correct the activity, policy, or practice."' 14 This writing
requirement is noticeably absent from the other two categories of pro-
tected activity, sections 448.101(2) and (3).
The second provision in which a written notice requirement is men-
tioned is section 448.103(1), which creates the right to action. Para-
graph (c) states:
An employee may not recover in any action brought pursuant to this
subsection if he failed to notify the employer about the illegal activ-
ity, policy, or practice as required by s. 448.102(1) or if the retalia-
109. Id. at 1049 (citation omitted).
110. 661 So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
111. The Baiton court cited Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., I1ic., 653 F.2d 1057, 1061-64
(5th Cir. 1981), for the proposition that an employer may not retaliate against an at-will employee
for filing a Jones Act claim because "such a retaliatory discharge 'constitutes an abuse of the
employer's absolute right to terminate the employment relationship when the employer utilizes
that right to contravene an established public policy'-namely, the right to file a personal injury
action against the maritime employer." Id. at 314.
112. Id. at 317.
113. Id. at 314.
114. FLA STAT. § 448.102(1) (1997).
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tory personnel action was predicated upon a ground other than the
employee's exercise of a right protected by this act.'
15
Thus, it has been argued that paragraph (c) of section 448.103, read
together with section 448.102, requires an employee to provide written
notice to the employer any time the employee intends to act under any
one of the enumerated categories in section 448.102.16 The Baiton
court, however, rejected this argument.117
Despite the language of section 448.103(1) of the statute, the court
construed the written notice requirement to apply to only those claims
invoking protection under section 448.102(1) of the Private Sector Act,
which specifically calls for such notice. 18 In doing so, however, the
court failed to adequately address Carnival's argument that the literal
reading of sections 448.102 and 448.103 together required such notice in
all situations.119 Moreover, the court did not address the facial ambigu-
ity of the statute. Perhaps the justification for this is that the adoption of
an interpretation calling for written notice in all circumstances would
produce results at odds with legislative intent, and would offend one's
good common sense. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Florida stated that
where statutory construction is required, the court should seek to effectu-
ate the legislative intent.120
The Second District Court of Appeal, however, in Potomac Systems
Engineering, Inc. v. Deering,"2 ' certified a conflict with the Baiton court
to the Florida Supreme Court over the written notice requirement. In
this case, Plaintiff Deering alleged that he was fired from his position as
a Deputy Director of Florida Operations for a defense contracting firm
because he refused to participate in acts of "mischarging, misreporting,
and the unauthorized use of government equipment in violation of fed-
eral law."' 22 Deering brought suit under section 448.102(3) of the Pri-
vate Sector Act alleging he was fired in retaliation for refusing to
participate in practices of the employer which were violations of law.'2 3
Mr. Deering did not provide notice to his employer of his suspected
violations of federal law. 124 Noting the conflict between the two courts,
the Potomac court held that the remedy outlined in section 448.103(1) is
115. Id. § 448.103(1)(c).
116. Richard A. Tuschman, Another Look at the Notice Requirement of the Florida Private
Sector Whistleblower's Act, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1997, at 43-44.
117. See Baiton, 661 So. 2d at 316.
118. Id. at 317.
119. Levine, supra note 96, at 60.
120. See Kelder v. ACT Corp., 650 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
121. 683 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
122. Id. at 181.
123. See id.
124. See id.
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only available if the employee has complied with section 448.103(c),
which requires written notification to the employer. 125 The Potomac
court cited with approval an unpublished decision of the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida for the same interpreta-
tion. In Martin v. Honeywell, Inc.,' 26 the Federal District Court held that
"the plain language of the statute imposes a written notice and opportu-
nity to cure requirement as an element of proof in every private sector
whistleblower claim because section 448.103(1)(c) incorporates the
notice provision set forth in 448.102(1). ' ' 27 Accordingly, the Honeywell
court dismissed the complaint of the plaintiff who failed to assert in his
complaint that notice was given.1 28 Remarkably, the Honeywell court
stated that "[w]hether or not written notice to the employer is a required
element of a whistleblower claim appears to be a question of first
impression in Florida,"'' 29 without citation to the Baiton opinion decided
in 1995. This is unfortunate because, despite the conflicting decisions in
Baiton and Potomac, the only existing analysis of the statutory provi-
sions which takes into account Florida's statutory numbering system is
Baiton. 
130
Moreover, the Potomac court cited Appeal of Bio Energy Corp.,131
a decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, for the proposition
that "[t]he [notice] requirement promotes the purpose of the act by
affording the employer the first opportunity to correct a violation. This
allows the employer to avoid, among other things, unnecessary harm to
its reputation, the burden of undergoing an investigation and preparation
for a hearing or trial."' 3 2 What remains unstated in the Potomac opinion
is New Hampshire's other stated goal: that employers should not be
"able to retain the 'benefit of notification, while avoiding the burdens
imposed if the employee was discharged because of his or her notifica-
tion to the employer. Such an interpretation would thwart the Act's pri-
mary purpose of encouraging employees to report their employers'
violations of law."' 33 Without a balancing of these goals in the interpre-
125. See id. at 182.
126. No. 95-234-CIV-T-24(A), 1995 WL 868604 (M.D. Fa. July 18, 1995).
127. Id. at *1.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Baiton, 661 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); see also Levine, supra note 95, at
59.
131. 607 A.2d 606 (N.H. 1992).
132. Potomac, 683 So. 2d at 182.
133. Bio Energy, 607 A.2d at 608. In summary, the court stated: "We wish to promote the
dual purposes of the Act-to encourage employees to come forward and report violations without
fear of losing their jobs and to ensure that as many alleged violations as possible are resolved
informally within the workplace." Id. at 609.
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tation of Florida's Private Sector Act, a consistent rationale is impossi-
ble in the whistleblower context.
Consistent with Baiton, the Hutchison court was also concerned
that too narrow an interpretation of the statutory provisions would defeat
the remedial purpose of the statute.' 34 In fact, in rejecting Prudential's
argument in Hutchison that only violations of laws, rules or regulations
that threatened the health, welfare or safety of the public at large were
the subject of protected whistleblowing, the court said, "[i]f the statute
were given that interpretation, it would defeat the remedial purpose
since there would be few, if any, situations to which the statute would
apply. We do not think that the legislature intended any such
interpretation."
135
Accordingly, Daniel R. Levine argues that the result in Baiton was
just, despite the court's flawed analysis. 36 He argues that the court
should have rested its decision on what must have been the legislative
intent of the statute. 137 There is, however, little guidance as to what that
the legislative intent was at the time of the Private Sector Act's passage
as an amendment to section 112.3187 (The Public Sector Act). One
could reasonably assume that the intent expressed under 112.3187 could
be applied to the new Private Sector Act:
It is the intent of the Legislature to prevent agencies or independent
contractors from taking retaliatory action against an employee who
reports to an appropriate agency violations of law on the part of a
public employer or independent contractor that create a substantial
and specific danger to the public's health, safety, or welfare. It is
further the intent of the Legislature to prevent agencies or independ-
ent contractors from taking retaliatory action against any person who
discloses information to an appropriate agency alleging improper use
of governmental office, gross waste of funds, or any other abuse or
gross neglect of duty on the part of an agency, public officer, or
employee. 138
Of course, one should infer that only the first sentence of intent
could possibly apply, that is, those actions that create a substantial and
specific danger to the public's health, safety, or welfare. The legislature
does not, however, include this limiting language in the Private Sector
134. Hutchison v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 645 So. 2d 1047, 1049 n.4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
135. Id. But see Kelder v. ACT Corp., 650 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (holding that
the statute required written notice to a governmental entity in order to effectuate the legislative
intent evinced by 1992 amendments despite the fact that supervisor may have had ability to
remedy the violation).
136. See Levine, supra note 96, at 60.
137. Id.
138. FLA. STAT. § 112.3187(2) (1997).
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Act and Hutchinson suggests that such an interpretation would contra-
vene even the intent behind the Public Sector Act itself.
The court in Baiton, however, did not look to the legislative intent
under section 112.3187. Instead, it construed Baiton's complaint as
being one for "refusing to lie under oath," thus falling within the ambit
of section 448.102(3), which prohibits retaliation because the employee
has "[o]bjected to, or refused to participate in, any activity, policy, or
practice of the employer which is in violation of a law, rule or regula-
tion."'139 This is so, according to the court, because lying under oath is
perjury, a crime under sections 837.012 and 837.02 of the Florida Stat-
utes. 1 40 This is significant because it suggests that the court is willing to
carve out an exception to the at-will doctrine where compliance with the
employer's wishes would either violate a civic obligation (truthful testi-
mony under oath), or subject the employee to criminal penalties. Other
states have adopted identical reasoning in this situation. 14  This may be
seen as a quid pro quo to the employee in an at-will situation, in that,
notwithstanding the broad discretion afforded to the employer, a fair sys-
tem is in place to protect the employee in cases where the employer may
have acted beyond that discretion. In this respect, there is no business
policy at risk, thus comporting with the at-will doctrine rather than
requiring an exception to it.
Moreover, Levine presents two situations in which a literal reading
of the statutory language, as urged by Carnival and applicable to the
employers' arguments in Honeywell and Potomac, would produce
absurd results and argues that "[i]f, in fact, the writing requirement
applied to all three subsections of § 448.102, then the statute would be,
for all practical purposes, defunct."'' 41 In the practical world, an
139. Baiton v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 661 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
140. See id.
141. See Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding a cause of
action was stated for wrongful discharge where the employee alleged he was fired because he
refused to deliver spoiled milk in violation of California unadulterated milk laws); Tameny v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (allowing cause of action for wrongful
discharge where the employee alleged he was fired for refusing to participate in illegal price
fixing); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)
(holding that a cause of action arises for wrongful discharge where the employer attempts to
coerce a criminal action-perjury); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co., 265 N.W.2d
385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (allowing a cause of action where plaintiff alleged dismissal as a result
of refusing to falsify state pollution reports); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J.
1980) (recognizing that where a discharge violates clear public policy, a cause of action may be
maintained). But see Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1981)
(holding that while an public policy exception would be wise, the federal court could not create
such an exception for Georgia and Texas); Ivy v. Army Times Publ'g Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C.
1981) (holding no cause of action for wrongful discharge where an employee testified truthfully,
but adversely to employer, in a suit brought against the employer, and was fired).
142. Levine, supra note 96, at 60.
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employee who fears retaliation would never blow the whistle. Addition-
ally, written notice would encourage disloyalty in the case of the
employee who is "building a case" against her employer. This result
would be at odds with the goal of maintaining a cohesive, efficient and
productive workplace environment consistent with Florida's pro-busi-
ness policy.
If the policy behind the notice requirement is to provide employers
an opportunity to cure any violation of a law, rule or regulation, that
policy is effectuated by the statute without requiring written notice under
subsections 448.102(2) and (3). Section 448.102(2) contemplates an
"investigation, hearing, or inquiry" already in progress. Thus, additional
notice from the employee that her employer's conduct is a violation of a
law, rule or regulation is absurd. The employer, in the midst of govern-
mental action via "agency, entity or, person" is fully aware of the
inquiry, thus obviating the need for a reminder from an employee who is
called to "provide information" or testify within that context. Had the
legislature intended to require an employee to apprise her employer of
her intent to comply with a subpoena, it would have so stated. Of
course, such notice would be nonetheless inappropriate.
Under section 448.102(3), an employee who has objected to, or
refused to participate in, any activity, policy or practice of the employer
has given constructive notice of her belief that the conduct in question is
objectionable. In this situation, however, a strong argument can be
made that an interpretation in favor of constructive notice would require
an employer to investigate every employee's refusal to perform before
terminating on insubordination grounds. Perhaps in this situation, the
written objection serves an evidentiary function in that judicial resources
are conserved because written notice obviates the need for dueling testi-
mony as to whether an objection or refusal was made and, if so, what
was said. Of course, it is the function of the jury is to resolve such
questions of credibility and, in employment cases, such testimony is an
element of almost every cause of action. In reality, allowing oral or
constructive notice would add nothing new to the mix. In the end,
requiring written notice in all subsections of section 448.102 would lead
to absurd results. Where a literal reading of a statute would produce
absurd results, construction is required.
Moreover, the Public Sector Act may help support the Third Dis-
trict's private sector decisions in that section 112.3188 provides for the
protection of the whistleblower by imposing a confidentiality require-
ment on those to whom the employee is expected to report suspected
violations.' 43 Indeed, the legislature provided that "[a]ny person who
143. FLA. STAT. § 112.3188(2)(b) (1997).
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willfully and knowingly discloses information or records made confi-
dential under this subsection commits a misdemeanor of the first degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083." 44 Thus, it is rea-
sonable to argue that the Florida Legislature understood the implications
of blowing the whistle and recognized the danger: employers do not like
it. Confidentiality protects the worker from adverse treatment, 4 5 and
the policy behind such a requirement does not change in the private
context. On the contrary, where the state has less opportunity to step in
and aid the whistleblower, a written notice requirement for a private
sector employee would be the last nail in the proverbial coffin. In this
regard, the same analysis should apply to private sector employees who
require greater protection from retaliation (as the ultimate boss is not the
state), and who have no recourse to the protection of the confidentiality
of their disclosures. Under the Public Sector Act, the analysis comes
full-circle: the employee does not have to provide written notice of her
complaint to her employer per se; 146 rather, she has the option of sub-
mitting a complaint to the Chief Inspector General, Agency Inspector
General, Office of the Public Counsel, or the whistleblower hotline.' 47
Unfortunately, the Private Sector Act is a victim of sloppy drafting
by the Florida legislature.'48 This is significant for Florida courts in
light of the traditional consideration given to rules of statutory construc-
tion. These canons are particularly strong in the area of employment
law as such issues uniquely pit the role of the judiciary against the role
of the legislature in the nexus of competing American values.
B. Law, Rule or Regulation
Another issue raised in cases brought under the Private Sector Act
is what constitutes a "law, rule, or regulation."'4 9 The reported cases,
and at least one unreported case, have defined the parameters of that
phrase. According to section 448.101(4), "Law, rule, or regulation
includes any statute or ordinance or any rule or regulation adopted pur-
suant to any federal, state, or local statute or ordinance applicable to the
144. Id. § 112.3188(2)(c)(4).
145. See id. § 448.101(5) (defining retaliatory personnel action as "the discharge, suspension,
or demotion by an employer of an employee or any other adverse employment action taken by an
employer against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment.").
146. See Kelder v. ACT Corp., 650 So. 2d 647, 648 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
147. See FLA. STAT. § 112.3187(6) (1997).
148. In declining to follow the Central District of California's construction of the Federal False
Claims Act, the Northern District of Illinois dropped a footnote, stating: "If only Congress more
often heeded Voltaire's advice: 'Let all laws be clear, uniform and precise: to interpret laws is
almost always to corrupt them."' Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 266, 273 n.7 (N.D. I11.
1993) (quoting VOLTAIRE, PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY (1962)).
149. FLA. STAT. § 448.101 (1997).
(Vol. 52:855
1998] FLORIDA PRIVATE SECTOR WHISTLE-BLOWER'S ACT 881
employer and pertaining to the business."
' 150
Florida courts are reticent to grant access to Private Sector Act rem-
edies against an employer when the conduct alleged is not tied specifi-
cally to a statute. In Forrester v. John H. Phipps, Inc., the Third District
Court of Appeal held that slander and false statements did not constitute
laws, rules or regulations sufficient to invoke the Act's protection.151 In
that same year, the Third District held that when a plaintiff can point to a
specific statutory provision governing employer conduct, a claim could
be stated under the Act. In Hutchinson v. Prudential Insurance Com-
pany of America, the employer, an insurance company, was alleged to
have engaged in unfair trade practices in violation of Florida Statutes
section 626.9541.52 The Court granted the plaintiff leave to amend his
complaint to include a claim under the Private Sector Act.'53
In Baiton, the Third District discussed the grounds on which an
employee could object to, or refuse to participate in, any activity, policy,
or practice of the employer. 154 The Court held that the employee's
refusal to lie under oath constituted a law, rule, or regulation pursuant to
Florida Statutes section 837.012 and 837.02, which provides criminal
penalties for pejury. 1 55 The Baiton case represents the broadest inter-
pretation of "law, rule or regulation." Conceivably, such an interpreta-
tion could be construed to include societal obligations which, although
not pertaining to an employer's specific business conduct, apply to all
Florida employers.
Currently, this specific issue is being reviewed by the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal in Maisonville v. Central Florida Lion Eye & Tis-
sue Bank. The plaintiff, a Director of Tissue Donation at the bank, is
appealing from a directed verdict on the issue of whether guidelines
promulgated by the Eye Bank Association of America for tissue banks
could constitute laws, rules or regulations pertaining to the employer's
business.' 56 The resolution of this appeal will determine whether self-
regulating industry standards are included in the statutory definition of
"law, rule, regulation."
While the literal statutory language does not include general indus-
try standards, it would be a manifest injustice to exclude them from the
definition. This is especially so in cases such as Maisonville, where eth-
150. Id. § 448.101(4).
151. See Forrester v. John H. Phipps, Inc., 643 So. 2d 1109, 1111-12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
152. See Hutchinson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 645 So. 2d 1047, 1048 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
153. See id.
154. See Baiton v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 661 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
155. See id.
156. See Maisonville v. Central Florida Lions Eye & Tissue Bank, 97 F.J.V.R. 11-67, 1997
WL 817962 (F.L.J.V.).
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ical practices and procedures exist for the administration of certain
industries and, as a society, we most certainly want to encourage com-
pliance with them where the industry is not specifically regulated by
federal or state law. The Baiton court's interpretation in this context is
progressive in that the Court adopts an interpretation of 448.101(4) that
could include self-regulating industry standards. Perjury, while statuto-
rily defined, also compromises the adversarial litigation system and
implicates the effectiveness of the judicial process in addition to defin-
ing a civic obligation. In this vein, whether or not such statutory lan-
guage is available should make no difference.
C. The Good-Faith Whistleblower
1. TRADITIONAL NOTIONS
The phrase "good-faith" is a legal nicety that is quick to both draw
support and escape exact definition. In the whistleblower context, good
faith, as traditionally understood, means that an employee is motivated
to blow the whistle in good faith, or, in an effort to truly remedy the
situation in which she finds herself and her employment. Along this line
of analysis, most states require that an employee cannot be protected
under Whistle-Blower statutes when motivated for bad faith reasons
such as extortion.' 57 The Florida Supreme Court, in Martin County v.
Edenfield,158 held that public employee participation in improper
employer conduct was a defense, not an exception to the statute's pro-
tections. In 1992, however, the Florida Public Sector Act was amended
to deny protection to whistleblowers who "committed or intentionally
participated in committing the violation or a suspected violation."'' 59 In
Edenfield, the effect of the amendment was foreshadowed. The court
noted in a footnote that "[t]his may not be true under the statute as it was
amended on July 7, 1992 .... These amendments, however, were retro-
active only until July 1, 1992. Accordingly, the 1992 amendments do
not apply to the present cause of action."' 6° This foresight was solidi-
fied in Kelder v. ACT Corp. 6 ' The Public Sector Act does not apply to
prisoners, former prisoners who seek to blow the whistle with regard to
157. See WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION: RIGHTs
AND REMEDIES 281 (2d ed. 1993) ("the Whistleblower Act was not intended to serve as a tool for
extortion.") (quoting Wolcott v. Champion Int'l Corp., 691 F. Supp. 1052, 1059 (W.D. Mich.
1987)).
158. 609 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1992).
159. FLA. STAT. ch. 112.3187(7) (1997); see also 1991 Fla. Laws ch. 92-316, § 12.
160. Martin, 609 So. 2d at 29 n.2.
161. 650 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). See id. at 649 (construing the effects of sections
112.3187(6) and (7) together, the court recognized the new language added by the 1992
amendment).
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their period of incarceration, or persons who have committed or inten-
tionally participated in the wrongdoing. 162 With respect to the partici-
pant in the wrongful act, this provision excludes the employee who is
motivated to blow the whistle by less honorable intentions.
The Private Sector Act does not explicitly require that a private
employee have a good faith reason for blowing the whistle. Although,
as stated above, it is reasonable to assume that the public and private
acts will be interpreted in a similar fashion, it is important to note that
the Private Sector Act does not include such a limitation in its statutory
language.
2. A PRACTICAL CONCEPTION OF GOOD FAITH
Good faith can also be understood to mean that the employee,
although not certain that her employer has committed an act violative of
a law, rule or regulation, acts with good faith in reporting an alleged or
suspected violation. This interpretation of good faith is more complex
than the first, as it implicates the at-will doctrine at its very core; such an
interpretation, in effect, is determinative on the issue of who decides
whether a whistleblower is prima facie protected-the employer or the
courts. The resolution of this issue will, in the real world, determine the
outcome of most litigation of retaliatory discharge cases in Florida
courts.
For the private sector whistleblower, Florida law is unclear as to the
protections afforded to the employee who is not absolutely certain that
her employer has engaged in improper conduct. Many states have
extended protections for whistleblowers who merely suspect improper
conduct. In the public context, for example, New York's Whistleblower
statute has been interpreted to require that "the employee need not be
right that a violation has in fact occurred but is protected if the employee
reasonably believed that a violation had occurred."' 16 3 Even Florida's
Public Sector Act protects the good faith whistleblower. The meaning
of section 112.3187 is unambiguous: it protects the employee who dis-
closes "[a]ny violation or suspected violation of any federal, state, or
local law, rule, or regulation"'1 64 and, "[a]ny act or suspected act of gross
mismanagement, malfeasance, misfeasance, gross waste of public funds,
or gross neglect of duty."' 65 There is no case law in Florida expounding
on this issue in the public context because, with good faith
162. FLA STAT. § 112.3187(7) (1997).
163. Cucchi v. New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., 818 F. Supp. 647, 656 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (quoting Governor Cuomo's Approval Memorandum about the Whistleblower Statute).
164. FLA. STAT. § 112.3187(5)(a) (1997) (emphasis added).
165. Id. § 112.3187(5)(b) (emphasis added).
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whistleblowers covered, the only questions are whether the
whistleblower is the type of person the statute was designed to protect,
and whether the disclosures were made with improper intentions.
Florida's Private Sector Act uses language different from the Public
Sector Act with regard to the good faith whistleblower. Under the Pri-
vate Sector Act, an employer may not take retaliatory personnel action
against an employee who has "[d]isclosed, or threatened to disclose, ...
an activity, policy, or practice of the employer that is in violation of a
law, rule, or regulation";' 66 "[p]rovided information to, or testified
before any ...entity conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry
into an alleged violation";167 or "[o]bjected to, or refused to participate
in, any activity, policy, or practice of the employer which is in violation
of a law, rule or regulation." '168 It could be argued that the literal lan-
guage of the statute suggests that an employee who, in good faith, sus-
pects her employer is acting in violation of a law, rule or regulation is
not protected under the Private Sector Act, unless the employer is
already under investigation by a government agency, person or entity.
Such an interpretation would hold the whistleblower to an unusually
high standard, requiring the employee to be the agent "on the inside," if
you will. Under this view, the private employee is required to be abso-
lutely certain of the employer's actions before blowing the whistle. In
effect, this interpretation would encourage the private whistleblower, at
the moment she suspects her employer is engaging in wrongdoing, to
begin a personal investigation of her employer in order to prove that her
suspicion is correct. Unfortunately, this would result in situations where
employees are forced to "build a case" against their employers. This is
not a desirable outcome for either employers or employees. Indeed, the
traditional business environment should foster loyalty, discretion, and
confidentiality.' 69 It is in this context that Florida courts should look to
the jurisprudence of other states who, like Florida, not only adhere
strongly to the at-will doctrine, but also encourage good faith
whistleblowing. Such action would promote logical coherence within
Florida's employment jurisprudence, and would support what may be
the best course of action for whistleblower policy.
In the private context, the Oregon decision in McQuary v. Bel Air
Convalescent Home, Inc. 170 provides interesting facts as a basis for dis-
cussion of the good faith issue. Laurie McQuary was the In-Service
Director of Nurses Training and Education at the Bel Air Convalescent
166. Id. § 448.102(1) (emphasis added).
167. Id. § 448.102(2) (emphasis added).
168. Id. § 448.102(3) (emphasis added).
169. See Blumberg, supra note 14.
170. 684 P.2d 21 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
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Home. McQuary alleged that she was fired from her position as a result
of her threat to report the nursing home administrator for patient abuse
against her aunt, a patient at the home.17' The Oregon Court of Appeals
characterized the whistleblower's dilemma in this way:
Either plaintiff must act at her peril in making a complaint, risking
her job if the complaint later turns out to be unfounded, or the
employer must act at its peril in firing her, risking damages if she
turns out to have acted in good faith. On balance, we believe that the
social harm from reporting in good faith a complaint that may turn
out, after investigation, to be unfounded is potentially far less than
the harm of not reporting a well-founded complaint for fear of the
consequences. The social benefit from investigating all potentially
significant violations of a patient's statutory rights is far greater than
the social benefit, if any, from allowing an employer to terminate an
employee who in good faith reports to the appropriate authorities sit-
uations which prove not to be violations.' 72
In this case, McQuary alleged in good faith that her employer's actions
violated her aunt's rights under the Nursing Home Patient's Bill of
Rights, for which the Oregon Health Division is responsible for enforc-
ing. The court stated that "a report to it would be a societal obligation of
a person who knows of violations . . . .A discharge for reporting a
violation of that policy to the proper authority would thus be a discharge
for fulfilling a societal obligation and would be actionable."'
' 73
In fact, many jurisdictions that support a strong at-will doctrine also
support such good faith whistleblowing. In Florida, such an interpreta-
tion is essential. Although public policy justifications have not held
sway in the Florida courts for the extension of worker protection, recent
case law suggests that there may be a discernible place for such argu-
ments in the whistleblower context. There are only two Florida deci-
sions that, while not addressing this specific ambiguity, may suggest an
answer to the question of whether a plaintiff who in good faith blows the
whistle is protected. In Cray v. NationsBank of North Carolina, the
employee invoked the protections of sections 448.101 through 448.105
after being terminated from his position as a registered securities repre-
sentative. 7 4 The employee alleged that he believed that NationsBank
171. See id. at 22-23.
172. Id. at 23.
173. Id. Noting that the Oregon Legislature's desire to protect patients reflected a "comparable
concern on the part of the federal government," the court stated: "42 C.F.R. § 442.311 shows that
that protection is an important public policy analogous to the performance of jury duty or the
avoidance of defamation, policies which the Supreme Court has found to justify wrongful
discharge claims." Id.
174. See Cray v. NationsBank of North Carolina, No. 94-981-CIV-T-17E ( M.D. Fla., Tampa,
Oct. 17, 1997).
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and NationSecurities were violating various state and federal laws gov-
erning the sale of securities and addressed a complaint in writing to
senior officers of both companies. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation,
the case was referred to an NASD ("National Association of Securities
Dealers") arbitration panel who ultimately decided that the plaintiff was
terminated in violation of the Private Sector Whistle-Blower's Act.1 75
While this decision arrived in court on a motion to confirm the
arbitration award and various other arbitration-related motions, it is sig-
nificant to the extent that the defendants did not seek to vacate the arbi-
trator's award based on the ground that the decision was "arbitrary or
capricious." This standard, one of two non-statutory grounds for vacatur
of an arbitration award recognized by the Eleventh Circuit, defines an
award as "arbitrary or capricious" if it "exhibits a wholesale departure
from the law, or if a legal ground for the arbitrator's decision cannot be
inferred from the facts of the case, or if the reasoning is to faulty that no
judge or group of judges could ever have conceivably made such a rul-
ing." 17 1 On the other hand, the defendants in this case may not have
raised the issue because the only remedy granted by the arbitrators was
reinstatement.1 77 While not directly on point, it can be inferred that the
plaintiff's good faith allegation of a violation of a law, rule or regulation
was sufficient in this case.
More recently, a Florida state court verdict was reported in a case
where the plaintiff, a Donor Tissue Transplant Coordinator, was termi-
nated after complaining to supervisors and the Director of the tissue
bank that various employees at the bank were engaging in unethical
practices and procedures in procuring next-of-kin consent for the
removal of corneal tissue, eliminating negative medical history from
donor records, and misuse of lab equipment resulting in the transplanta-
tion of unhealthy cells into unsuspecting donees. 178 The Court denied
the Tissue Bank's motion for summary judgment, thus giving the plain-
tiff an opportunity to prove that "private entity or self-regulating indus-
try standards, such as the guidelines of the Eye Bank Association of
America, may operate as a functional equivalent of a public regulatory
agency."' 7 9 At trial, the defendants moved for a directed verdict and,
after the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on her Private Sector
175. See id. at *3.
176. Id. See also Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 941 (1lth Cir. 1992); Borden v.
Hammers, 941 F. Supp. 1170, 1174 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Matter of Arbitration Between Prudential-
Bache Securities, Inc. and Depew, 814 F. Supp. 1081 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
177. See Cray, supra note 170.
178. See Maisonville v. Central Florida Lions Eye & Tissue Bank, 97 F.J.V.R. 11-67, 1997
WL 817962 (F.L.J.V.).
179. Id. at Editor's note.
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Whistle-Blower's claim, awarding a total of $ 132,380.60 (including
damages for pain and suffering), the court granted the motion on the
ground that there was no state or federal "law, rule or regulation" upon
which plaintiffs contentions could be founded. 18° As of June 1998,
appeals by both parties are pending.
V. PRACTITIONER'S NOTE: FLORIDA LITIGATION AND STRATEGY
Oftentimes, a plaintiff's lawyer has one goal in mind when it comes
to employment issues: Get to the jury! With a private whistleblower as
a client, however, this task may prove more difficult that at first glance.
In theory, all lawyers hope that their whistleblowing clients will
consult them before actually blowing the whistle. In reality, however,
and as any practitioner who has represented a whistleblower knows, this
almost never occurs, as employees rarely are in a position to keep pri-
vate attorneys on retainer. 81 So, in preparation for the day when an
actual whistleblower walks into the office, here are some important
aspects of the Private Sector Act to note.
First and foremost, Florida courts have not yet explicitly recognized
the Private Sector Act as creating an exception to the common law at-
will doctrine via legislative fiat. There is support for this argument in
light of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Piezo Technol-
ogy & Professional Administrators, Inc. in the worker's compensation
context.1 82 The problem is that the Private Sector Act has less in the
way of legislative history to drawn upon than did the Workers Compen-
sation Act, upon which the workers compensation exception is based.
This may prove problematic in that it may be difficult to draw a mean-
ingful analogy between the tort insurance-dominated subject of workers
compensation and the state's recent acceptance of whistleblowing as
protected conduct in the workplace.
Second, there are several procedural obstacles to overcome before
filing suit. Initially, the private employee must work in an organization
with more than ten employees in order to qualify as an "employee"
under the statute. It is yet unclear whether the Baiton or the Potomac
court's interpretation of the Private Sector Act's written notice require-
ment will survive. A definite resolution remains to be seen. At this
point, it would be prudent to counsel potential whistleblowers to submit
written notice of alleged violations to the employer. Moreover, a court
180. Id.
181. See generally LOYALTY & DissENT, supra note 4 (providing an overall description of the
typical whistleblower through ten stories of those who have blown the whistle).
182. 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983) (creating an exception to the at-will doctrine based on a cause
of action created by workers compensation laws).
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will find a "law, rule or regulation" if a specific federal or state statute
directly pertains to the employer's business. It remains to be seen
whether self-regulating industry guidelines will fall within this
definition.
Finally, as to whether or not a private employee who, in good faith,
blows the whistle on a suspected violation is protected under the Private
Sector Act or not, only time will tell. Many states have adopted such an
interpretation in the absence of statutory language in spite of a strong
stance in favor of the at-will doctrine. The task is to persuade the Flor-
ida courts to accept such a reading of the statute.
It would seem to be a waste of legislative and judicial resources to
deny statutory protection to private employees who are in the best posi-
tion to uncover improper conduct in the workplace, perhaps resulting in
the conservation of consumer resources or even lives, yet who are in the
worst position to disclose such evidence. Nor would we want to
encourage behavior that taints the honorable motivations behind pro-
tected whistleblowing. Ultimately, it will be up to the citizens of the
state of Florida to demand from their representatives the scope of
whistleblower protection they deem fair. Until then, despite elusive stat-
utory protections, the private sector employee blows the whistle at her
own risk.
KIMBERLY A. McCoY*
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